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Malicious insider activities on military networks can pose a threat to military operations. 
Early identification of malicious insiders assists in preventing significant damage and 
reduces the overall insider threat to military networks. Security Information and Event 
Management (SIEM) tools can be used to identify potential malicious insider activities.  
SIEM tools provide the ability to normalize and correlate log data from multiple 
sources on networks. Personnel background investigations and administrative action 
information can provide data sources for SIEM tools in order to assist in early 
identification of the insider threat by correlating this information with the individual’s 
online activities.  
This thesis provides background information on the components and functionality 
of SIEM tools, summarizes historic insider threat cases to determine common 
motivations, provides an overview of military security investigations and administrative 
actions in order to determine candidate sources for SIEM correlation, and provides an 
overview of common methods of data exfiltration by malicious insiders. This information 
is then used to develop an example SIEM architecture that highlights how the military 
can use a SIEM to identify and prevent potential internal insider threats by correlating an 
individual’s network activities with background investigation and administrative action 
information. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Computer networks continue to evolve and increase in complexity. As more and 
more devices are developed with network connectivity capabilities, the surface area for 
potential security vulnerabilities to these networks and their numerous connected devices 
increases. Thus, safeguarding networks and the data that transits through them is a 
perpetual arms race. As new vulnerabilities are discovered, new patches are added; only 
to be made irrelevant by new vulnerability discoveries, new devices (with new 
vulnerabilities), new network paths (connected to new devices), or  some combination 
thereof. However, despite the increased complexity and potential vulnerabilities, systems 
that are properly patched and managed following the “least privilege” principle fair far 
better when subjected to various attacks.  
The insider threat is considered by many to be the most difficult threat to prevent 
and discover. The insider, by “definition,” has authorized access to systems that an 
outsider will not. The insider is a trusted agent with knowledge that can be leveraged to 
exploit a system. Much research and many studies have been conducted to try and 
discover ways to prevent, detect, and mitigate insider threats. The ability of a network 
administrator to monitor and audit device logs can potentially lead to the discovery of 
illicit insider activity; or perhaps to indicators that an insider is “about to go rogue.”  
However, given the number of devices connected to a network, the number of employees, 
the number of potential insider threats, and the time and labor required to properly and 
thoroughly investigate logs both in real time and historically, such monitoring becomes 
an overwhelming challenge.  
B. OBJECTIVES 
The introduction of a technological solution can assist with the goal of more 
thorough log monitoring. A Security Information and Event Management (SIEM) tool 
provides a way for system log information from numerous logging nodes to be collected 
centrally and analyzed for anomalies. If an anomaly is detected, based on the 
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organization’s previously defined rule sets, an alert can be sent to designated security 
personnel for further investigation or action, if necessary. However, without a properly 
defined rule-set, the organization runs the risk of having too many false negatives (real 
threats that are missed) or, conversely, false positives (innocuous events which are 
erroneously tagged as malicious); exacerbating the defender’s job, rather than helping.  
Identification of users who may have an increased propensity to conduct illicit 
activities as insider threat, would be highly beneficial. This could potentially be achieved 
by focusing a SIEM tool in a manner that reduces false alerts, and more reliably detects 
malicious insider actions, or perhaps provides indications and warnings that a trusted 
insider may be in the early planning stages of carrying out some malicious act (Hanley & 
Montelibano, 2011). 
The Department of the Navy (DON) attempts to reduce insider threats by first 
conducting a background investigation prior to an employee receiving a security 
clearance and/or network and system access (Secretary of the Navy, 2006). This 
investigation, called a Personnel Security Investigation (PSI), contains many data points 
that are not necessarily preclusive of receiving a security clearance or employment within 
the DON. For example, an employee who may have had financial difficulties in the past 
but does not have other risky data points in their background investigation, may have no 
problem receiving a security clearance or system access. However, the fact the employee 
had previous financial difficulties suggests he/she may be more at risk of becoming an 
insider threat at some point in the future.  
In addition, administrative actions conducted against an employee for work 
incidents (poor performance, behavior issues, physical fitness test failures, etc.) can also 
provide further data points regarding an individual and the risk of insider threats (CERT, 
2011). While one or many of these examples may not be indicative or predictive, it can 
be helpful to have these data points attached to a person’s user profile on a network. With 
these data points accessible, rules can be developed within a SIEM that leverage this 
additional information in order to more reliably alert on certain network behaviors.  
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By adding potential security flags already gathered through the process of PSIs 
and administrative actions, a user’s network account can be flagged for monitoring of 
potentially suspicious or dangerous network behavior. For example, if a user has 
previously had financial issues, their Web activity could be flagged to issue an alert if 
they are visiting bankruptcy information or credit counseling sites. While not necessarily 
predictive of the evolution of an actual insider threat, the alerts can trigger management 
action which might involve further monitoring, counseling with the individual, or other 
managerial activities that would ideally prevent the insider from ever getting to the point 
of actually conducting illegal or malicious activities. 
An example SIEM architecture will be designed using ArcSight Express and 
reviewed for potential applicability to a Navy command in order to address the issues of 
the insider threat. This architecture will include employee PSI and administrative action 
data, and represent an attempt at designing a method to relate this data with employee 
network activities; with the end goal of identifying potential or actual malicious insider 
activity. 
C. ORGANIZATION 
This documented is organized into the following chapters: 
Chapter II provides background of the origins of SIEM tools, and basics on the 
dangers of the insider threat. 
Chapter III provides details on the basic features of a SIEM. Node logging, 
normalization, and correlation processes are discussed, and the basic components of a 
SIEM tool are described. The potential advantages and disadvantages of a SIEM tool are 
also provided. 
Chapter IV contains insider threat definitions and policies. It also contains 
descriptions of the various categories of insider threats and some of the motivations for 
insiders conducting malicious activities. 
Chapter V is divided into three main parts, PSI, administrative action, and the 
individual account creation process within the Navy. PSI describes the background 
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investigations required for military personnel and the process required. The 
administrative action section describes some of the types of tools available to a command 
for discipline in response to certain employee activities, and how those actions are 
documented in the individual’s record. The third section describes the process by which 
an individual obtains a network account within the Navy, and how that might be adjusted 
in order to include PSI and administrative action items. 
Chapter VI describes some of the basic methods an individual can employ to 
remove information, without authorization, from a command. Some of these described 
methods can then be incorporated as conditions for the example SIEM architecture. 
Chapter VII contains an example SIEM architecture for including PSI and 
administrative action items. Goals of the SIEM architecture are described and the overall 
architecture is presented. This description includes the types of filters necessary, the use 
of multiple active lists, and how the described rules use these active lists. Examples of 
each, created within ArcSight Express, are provided.  
Chapter VIII provides concluding statements regarding the previous chapters, and 
provides areas that might benefit from additional research leading to a more optimal 
implementation of a SIEM tool in addressing insider threats. 
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II. BACKGROUND 
A. INFORMATION SYSTEMS CONTINUOUS MONITORING (NIST SP 
800–137) 
The National Institute for Standards and Technology, under the Federal 
Information Security Management Act (FISMA), is responsible for development of 
information security standards and guidelines for federal information systems (Dempsey 
et al., 2011). As part of these responsibilities, NIST has issued the Information Security 
Continuous Monitoring (ISCM) for Federal Information Systems and Organizations in 
September 2011. This publication describes the implementation of ISCM in federal 
organizations as part of an overall risk mitigation and management strategy for federal 
information systems.  
Previous federal publications highlighted the importance of monitoring 
information systems as part of the overall management of security practices. However, 
these methods of monitoring information systems were manpower intensive. There are 
now automated tools available that assist managers in their ability to conduct continuous 
monitoring of their information systems, traffic, and users’ network activities in order to 
better provide effective security controls from both inside and outside threats. NIST 
describes the goal of these automated monitoring tools as being able to be “readily 
deployed in support of near real-time, risk-based decision making” (Dempsey et al., 
2011, p. 8). 
NIST defines ISCM as an organization maintaining ongoing awareness of 
information security vulnerabilities and threats to support organizational risk 
management decisions. It further elaborates on the ISCM program and process where the 
program is “established to collect information in accordance with pre-established metrics, 
utilizing information readily available in part through implemented security controls” 
(Dempsey et al., 2011, p. vii). The overall ISCM process contains the key elements of 
analyzing the data, reporting the findings, and responding to those findings (Dempsey et 
al., 2011). This analysis of data and reporting of the results can be assisted through the 
use of an automated security tool such as a SIEM product. 
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NIST defines SIEM tools as being able to “enhance the ability to identify 
inappropriate or unusual activity…through analysis of vulnerability scanning 
information, performance data, network monitoring, and system audit record (log) 
information” (Dempsey et al., 2011, p. D-10). A SIEM is basically a tool that can receive 
inputs from multiple nodes that may be manufactured by multiple vendors, filter for 
select information, normalize these inputs, aggregate the inputs as necessary, and then 
conduct rule-based analysis on the inputs in order to detect patterns or anomalies that 
may require further action by management personnel.  
B. SIEM ORIGINS 
The advancement of technologies has allowed for the development of these SIEM 
tools that can provide an organization’s management with a continuous monitoring 
solution for a variety of their information system needs, including those described in the 
NIST SP 800–137. The emergence of the SIEM as a multi-task capable tool has provided 
organizations with the capability to manage and monitor network data that was 
previously difficult due to both the vast amount of data, and the dearth of technically 
capable personnel available to conduct the analysis.  
The origin of the acronym SIEM comes from the combination of Security 
Information Management (SIM) and Security Event Management (SEM). SIM tools 
aggregated and stored log data for organizations. SEM tools applied some sort of analysis 
to this log data in order to assist in identifying potential threats. The combination of these 
two related capabilities produced the modern SIEM (Schultz, 2009). These tools are also 
sometimes referred to as Enterprise Security Management (ESM) (Contos, 2006). 
Throughout this paper, these tools will be referred to as SIEM tools. These early SIEMs 
emerged to assist network security personnel in filtering through firewall data, intrusion 
detection data, router events, etc., in order to eliminate false positives and identify true 
threats (Sensage, n.d.). 
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C. INSIDER THREAT DANGERS 
Recent events highlighting the dangers of insider threats such as Army PFC 
Bradley Manning and others have reinforced the need for more accurate means and 
methods to assist in the identification of insider threats. While Bradley Manning caused 
much of the damage from his alleged access to a classified network and subsequent 
release of hundreds of thousands of classified documents (Weiss, 2013), insiders can still 
cause damage with only unclassified access. The DoD has obvious concerns over the 
control of unclassified information and has released a directive, DODM 5200.01-V4, 
defining specific requirements for managing Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI). 
A malicious insider can cause considerable damage regardless of the classification of the 
networks compromised. 
Early detection of these events can decrease the amount of damage resulting from 
malicious insider activities. Insiders have an obvious attack advantage, as they will likely 
have significant “insider” information on the organization to which they are attached. 
This allows them greater freedom of movement within the organization and a reduced 
threat of detection if they know the security policies and procedures of the organization to 
which they are attached. It is also easier for an insider to explain away potentially 
malicious behavior as owing to ignorance or accidental violations. Monitoring an 
insider’s activities on an organization’s network, classified or unclassified, offers the 
possibility of earlier detection, and perhaps even prevention, of malicious activities. A 
SIEM can assist in identifying and correlating these activities. A SIEM can also be used 
to focus on personnel who may have factors in their background that might increase their 
overall security risk.  
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III. SIEM CAPABILITIES 
A. SIEM BASIC FEATURES 
According to research conducted by the Gartner group, SIEMs are typically 
employed by corporations for use against internal and external threats, monitoring user 
activities, monitoring servers and databases, and for rules and regulation compliance 
(Nicolett & Kavanagh, 2012). The general functions and features of SIEMs are 
highlighted below in order to illustrate the capabilities of these tools.  
1. Node Logging  
Each network can be unique to an organization. While headquarters may set 
configuration policies regarding basic design and topology, there are many variations that 
can occur within a specific network, even amongst similar organizations or departments. 
There are many types of nodes on these networks that can provide logs or information for 
SIEM collection. Some examples include printers, servers, and door key access logs, 
alarm activation logs, and applications such as web-browsing or e-mail. These nodes can 
be capable of producing logs detailing a variety of activities related to the specific node. 
Some typical types of event logs are operations performed by the node, times of 
operations, personnel who accessed the node, personnel who initiated the operation, and 
others depending on the type of node. These logs provide records of activities that can be 
potentially collected and analyzed using a SIEM tool (Schultz, 2009).  
2. Event Normalization  
Prior to collecting the logs from various node sources, there must be a way to 
translate the various formats of these devices and applications into a common format. 
“When events from heterogeneous sources are normalized, they can be analyzed by a 
smaller number of correlation rules, which reduces deployment and support labor. In 
addition, normalized events are easier to work with when developing reports and 
dashboards” (Nicolett & Kavanagh, 2012). There are two widely used formats for 
normalizing these log events. One is the Common Event Expression, which was 
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developed by the MITRE Corporation, and the other is Common Event Format, 
developed by ArcSight (Capelli, Moore, & Trzeciak, 2012).  
3. Correlation 
After normalizing the log events for central collection and analysis, there must 
also be a way to correlate the events with each other. This correlation can be between 
events from the same source or from different sources. Manually correlating numerous 
logs can be a difficult process as the amount of data events produced from even a single 
node can yield vast amounts of information. This can create a situation where it is not 
realistic to manually analyze and correlate these events and potential indicators of 
malicious activities may go undetected. A SIEM provides a means to apply pre-defined 
rules automatically to the collected, aggregated and normalized events. This removes the 
requirement for personnel to manually analyze events. A SIEM rule can be defined to 
indicate a correlation if certain log event parameters are met. These rules can be designed 
to highlight a correlation between events that may indicate malicious insider activity 
(ArcSight, 2012).  
For example, a log event may be generated showing an employee accessing a 
station or office outside of normal work hours for that specific employee (Capelli et al., 
2012). In addition, log events may be generated showing a high level of printer activity 
from that employee’s workstation. Any or all employee actions that elicited these events 
may be benign, or they may be indicative of malicious activity. By correlating the events, 
a deeper picture of that employee’s overall network activities can be derived, and 
potential issues may be identified for further investigation. 
The employee may simply be working after hours to finish legitimate work 
requirements. The employee may be exploiting the organization’s availability of free 
printing services for non-work related activities. Or, more dangerously, the employee 
may be attempting to remove sensitive data during hours when fewer people will 
question or observe these activities. In any case, these two individual events, when 
correlated, might trigger an alert for that employee’s supervisor for more detailed 
investigations or actions (Schultz, 2009). Using a SIEM’s capability to automatically 
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correlate events based on applied rules can provide insight into potentially related 
activities of interest that may require further evaluation or investigation (Capelli et al., 
2012). 
4. Filters 
With numerous nodes providing log events, it becomes necessary to filter out 
some log event inputs and concentrate on the important events. Important, in this context, 
means those events that are deemed most likely to provide meaningful security cueing 
information. Filters are used to reduce the overall amount of events processed by the 
SIEM. Filters can be designed to be broad or narrow in the scope of events they filter. For 
example, an administrator may wish to only include log events from certain workstations 
or IP addresses, or during a specific time period, or even certain applications involved. 
Filters can be specified to focus on these events for evaluation and they can also be used 
as components of a SIEM rule. Within the ArcSight SIEM product, filters are a basic 
component used in rule development. They are a “set of conditions that focus on 
particular event attributes” (ArcSight, 2012, p. 57).  The filters select only the events that 
match those conditions for further processing by the SIEM. A filter is defined using 
ArcSight’s Common Conditions Editor, and once defined it can be saved as a named 
conditions filter that allows it to be used by other resources of the SIEM (ArcSight, 
2012). Rules can then easily implement those named condition filters as components of 
the overall rule without having to define the same filter over and over. This can also help 
limit mistakes in rule development if a filter is rather complex (Miller, Harris, Harper, 
VanDyke, & Blask, 2011).  
5. Rules 
Rules are used within a SIEM to evaluate events received from normalized log 
data that will produce a certain result. Rules within ArcSight are typically created using a 
combination of previously defined filters “joined together” using Boolean logic (e.g., 
AND, OR, NOT). The intent is to design rules to perform some useful security action 
when the semantics of some select subset of events collectively indicate the existence, or 
possibility of existence, of a security policy violation. Aggregation within rules allows for 
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for responses to be triggered after a specified number of occurrences within a specified 
time frame. This can be useful in recognizing patterns of activities and can also reduce 
false positives based on single occurrence events. Rules within ArcSight can be 
configured to take one or more actions based on one event, multiple events, event 
thresholds, or some minimum number of events occurring within some specified time 
interval(s)  (Miller et al., 2011).  
When the previously defined conditions of a rule are met within ArcSight, a 
correlation event occurs and is added to the database, highlighting the important event for 
SIEM operators (ArcSight, 2012). In addition to generating correlation events, matched 
rules can also perform previously defined actions. Two example actions are: 1) sending 
notifications to designated personnel, and 2) executing a mitigating response action such 
as shutting down an infected node (Miller et al., 2011). Further details of designing SIEM 
rules used within ArcSight will be examined in Chapter VII. 
6. Dashboards 
The use of dashboards within SIEMs allows for a convenient central location for 
monitoring an organization’s network activity. The various logs from nodes connected to 
the SIEM can be used as data sources for display on the dashboard. The dashboard may 
be configured to display a variety of information related to the dashboard monitor’s 
advertised usage and functionality, or some other tailor-made information that supports 
the unique needs of an organization. If an item of interest or an alert shows up on a SIEM 
dashboard, the SIEM operator interface allows the operator to drill-down on the 
information regarding the event in order to more closely inspect and analyze the activity 
(ArcSight, 2012).  
7. Alerts and Reports 
Data from the various events and activities that provide log event sources to the 
SIEM can be used to generate alerts and reports. Depending on the event and the rules 
established for that event, an alert may be sent to a supervisor or to a security specialist 
within the organization. These alerts are preconfigured so they are generated 
automatically when a trigger event or event threshold occurs that warrants an alert. Also, 
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reports can be generated within a SIEM that can show a variety of data germane to a 
given incident or case. These reports can be generated on a set cycle or as needed, 
depending on the situation and needs of the organization. Reports can be used to assist in 
evaluating events in more detail or by comparing events to historic data (ArcSight, 2012). 
8. Log Storage 
One crucial configuration parameter relates to log storage. An organization must 
typically comply with a variety of regulations and policies (both organization specific and 
legal imperatives) regarding the storage of its log records. In the initial set-up of the 
SIEM (and periodically as well), an organization can designate priority records for log 
storage in terms of its size limits and time limits in order to comply with pertinent 
regulations (Schultz, 2009). This storage will also affect the ability to correlate events as 
significant time may elapse between important network events. This might result in a 
failure to detect a slowly evolving attack. For example, if an event drops out of the 
database due to expired time, another similar event will not be considered quite as serious 
during correlation by the SIEM as there were no pre-existing events to show a potential 
pattern. 
B. SIEM ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES 
As with any tool, there are certain advantages and disadvantages associated with 
SIEM implementation, operation, and maintenance that will affect its utility to the 
organization and its overall performance. The following sections highlight some of the 
general advantages and disadvantages with SIEM usage. A SIEM will have different 
values to an organization depending on the desired features and accessories available. 
1. SIEM Advantages 
In addition to the reasons provided above highlighting the capabilities of a SIEM 
tool and the advantages of its use, a properly configured and implemented SIEM can also 
provide for an overall reduction in labor time and costs. A SIEM’s ability to consolidate 
multiple logs from multiple products into a central location, while automatically checking 
events against previously defined rules, will greatly decrease the amount of time required 
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compared with that required for one or more analysts  to perform these functions 
manually. A SIEM’s ability to centrally manage multiple resources while filtering events 
and conducting analysis and then automatically generating reports and alerts can 
significantly improve the security posture of an organization’s network. However, it is 
difficult to put a dollar amount to the value of an improved security posture, as the costs 
of defending against unrealized threats are not easily quantifiable (Schultz, 2009). 
2. SIEM Disadvantages 
The overall monetary costs and time costs of installing and maintaining useful 
technology can be prohibitively expensive for some organizations. Depending on the 
organization’s requirements, these costs can effectively prevent that organization from 
taking advantage of the previously described benefits of SIEM tools. The costs to 
consider for a SIEM generally include purchase, installation, maintenance, employee 
training and ongoing licensing, depending on the size and scale of SIEM required.  
The dollar amount for a SIEM can be fairly easy to ascertain based on the 
vendor’s sales information. However, the cost that is difficult to estimate is the cost and 
labor lost due to the installation of the system: “…installation for such SIEM tools may 
take up to an entire month” (Schultz, 2009, p. 7). This installation process can have a 
severe negative impact for an organization’s functionality as network nodes are 
connected and their output fed into the centralized SIEM system. There can also be 
significant ongoing costs related to allocating staff time for SIEM operations and 
maintenance. 
a. Operations 
In order for a SIEM to be of maximal use to an organization; it must be in 
continuous and constant operation. This can be a potential downside to a SIEM if an 
organization has difficulty maintaining the constancy of SIEM operations. Also, the 
required integration of the numerous nodes into the SIEM can be a difficult managerial 
and technical problem. After a SIEM is up and smoothly running, updates present an 
ongoing challenge. Software updates for the SIEM software, updates for the connected 
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nodes, and hardware updates will present added challenges for integration for network 
administrators (Schultz, 2009). 
b. False Security 
Another potential disadvantage to using a SIEM is the false sense of 
security that may develop within an organization. If a SIEM is operating and everything 
appears to be normal for the SIEM operators, the operators may become lulled into 
believing everything is well with the network. SIEM operators must ensure there is a 
process for checking the SIEM to ensure it is correctly operating: nodes are connected, 
logs are being collected, correlated, and managed, and rules and dashboards are 
accurately displaying the desired information. The potential complexity of a SIEM can 
result in the possibility where disconnected or misconnected nodes might spiral into 
catastrophic network failures, or situations where serious network events are ignored 
(Schultz, 2009). 
c. Data Storage 
As technology develops, components on networks are able to generate 
logs of operations, user actions, maintenance requirements, and a variety of other types of 
data. This data can be collected and analyzed by the SIEM in order to monitor for 
potential items of interest. However, as there is more and more data available for a SIEM 
to collect, analyze, and archive, the requirement for data storage also increases. An 
organization must ensure it is collecting and storing the data to meet its requirements as 
defined by the organization. If an organization’s data storage capacity is overwhelmed, 
new data may be lost or otherwise not available for analysis, and the SIEM will no longer 
function properly (Schultz, 2009).  
The availability of a node to provide data to a SIEM does not necessarily 
mean that all the data that could be collected, should be collected (Schultz, 2009). 
Balancing the needs of the organization against the capabilities of the SIEM, the network, 
and the storage capacity of the organization, will be necessary to achieve optimum 
functionality of the SIEM in its ability to provide defense against the insider threat. 
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IV. INSIDER THREATS 
The purpose of this paper is to explore the feasibility of using a SIEM’s 
capabilities together with data collected and readily available on military personnel, both 
officers and enlisted, in order to deter, potentially prevent and—at a minimum--hopefully 
detect insider threats. Like any other organization, the military is susceptible to insider 
threats and the mitigation of the insider threat is critical to the military’s mission. 
However, if it is impossible to prevent the threat, then detecting insider threat activity at 
the earliest possible moment is the next goal in order to limit the damage. Further, simple 
awareness that a threat detection capability is in place may deter the insider from even 
considering any threat actions, owing to the increased risk of detection and punishment. 
The military must also adhere to national policy and service policy in order to remain in 
compliance with instructions dictating the need to combat the insider threat.  
Insider threats in the private sector can use the same tactics, techniques, and 
procedures as those within the military. These private sector insider threats will likely 
have the same motives, profiles, and characteristics as those within the military. This 
chapter will explore insider threat definitions and policies, historic data on insider threat 
events, and historic data on insider threat motivations. The goal is to develop potential 
profiles or possible indicators for insider threats. This data can then be used to construct 
SIEM rules for an individual’s specific activity within a network, with the goal of 
malicious insider detection. 
A. INSIDER THREAT DEFINITIONS AND POLICIES 
There are recent policies and instructions released by the President of the United 
States and DoD concerning insider threats within the United States government. These 
documents contain information to assist in combatting the insider threat as well as 
definitions of the insider threat. This section will examine DoD definitions of insider 
threats, the recent presidential memorandum regarding insider threats, and the DoD 
instruction related to insider threat programs. 
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1. DoD Definitions 
a. Insider 
DoD defines an insider as “anyone who has authorized access to DoD 
resources by virtue of employment, volunteer activities, or contractual relationship with 
DoD” (Under Secretary of Defense [I], 2012). 
b. Insider Threat 
DoD defines the insider threat as “a person with authorized access, who 
uses that access, wittingly or unwittingly, to harm national security interests or national 
security through unauthorized disclosure, data modification, espionage, terrorism, or 
kinetic actions resulting in loss or degradation of resources or capabilities” (Under 
Secretary of Defense [I], 2012). 
2. National Insider Threat Policy Presidential Memorandum November 
21, 2012 
This brief memorandum outlines the basic requirements for government 
departments to combat the threat from insiders. This memorandum requires departments 
to “deter, detect, and mitigate actions by employees who may represent a threat to 
national security” (White House, 2012), which is the goal of this research, specifically for 
Navy military members. In addition, the memorandum dictates the requirement to have 
the “capability to gather, integrate, and centrally analyze and respond to key [insider] 
threat related information” (White House, 2012). This requirement can be aided in 
execution by a SIEM via its capability to incorporate employee data into its rules and 
analytical procedures. 
3. DODI 5240.26 Countering Espionage, International Terrorism, and 
the Counterintelligence Insider Threat  
This instruction “establishes policy, assigns responsibilities, and provides 
procedures for counterintelligence (CI) activities to counter espionage and international 
terrorist threats to DoD…” (Under Secretary of Defense [I], 2012). Within Enclosure 2 of 
this instruction is the direction of responsibilities of the secretaries of the military 
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departments. One of these instructions is for the department secretaries to “establish and 
implement CI initiatives to identify and counter espionage, international terrorism, and 
the CI insider threat.” (Under Secretary of Defense [I], 2012). Incorporating a SIEM with 
rules based on users’ PSI and adverse administrative action data, as part of a 
department’s insider threat detection capability could assist in meeting the objectives of 
this instruction. Another relevant item is for the secretaries to “conduct anomaly based 
detection activities...” (Under Secretary of Defense [I], 2012). Again, the use of a SIEM 
can assist in meeting this requirement through event correlation rules designed to detect 
anomalous activities.  
4. DoD Counterintelligence  Insider Threat Program   
Within DODI 5240.26 is Enclosure 3, which contains requirements for the 
establishment of a Counterintelligence (CI) Insider Threat Program. Items from this 
program that are most relevant to this thesis are described below. 
a. Auditing and Monitoring 
The first element of the program includes the directive to conduct on-line 
behavioral monitoring. This must be done with a set of automated tools that will have the 
ability to easily share data across the DoD and the Intelligence community to ease 
interoperability within DoD and the IC (Under Secretary of Defense [I], 2012). Tailoring 
rules to each user for specific monitoring and being able to easily share this information 
across DoD and Intelligence Community systems is key for this tool to function 
effectively. Without the sharing capability, crucial data could be lost and not travel with 
the employee as they move from command to command.  
b. Analyzing Foreign Influence 
The second item addresses the requirement for a process in which DoD 
personnel can report all their foreign travel and foreign contacts. This element states the 
process shall be integrated into the travel system and that both pre-travel and post-travel 
briefings are required (Under Secretary of Defense [I], 2012). This requirement is an 
attempt to document an employee’s potential foreign influence. An employee who travels 
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to foreign countries may be susceptible to recruitment efforts by foreign intelligence 
actors or may develop sympathies to those countries. Also, an employee who has close 
and continuing contact with foreigners may also be susceptible to recruitment, or 
influence, by those foreigners. This requirement for reporting foreign influence can 
become an integral part of a specific user’s account. 
c. PSI Requirements 
This item directs the program to comply with all the requirements in the 
DoD Manual 5200.01-V-3, the DoD Information Security Program: Protection of 
Classified Information. If, during the course of a PSI, potential CI information becomes 
available regarding an individual, both the personnel security and the CI professionals 
must coordinate their activities (Under Secretary of Defense [I], 2012). This item also 
directs these entities to coordinate if CI information comes to light during personnel 
evaluations, analysis and reporting. It is required for personnel with security clearances to 
report to their security representative a variety of potential CI related incidents. This is 
required because these incidents can potentially make an individual more susceptible to 
becoming a malicious insider. These events are then evaluated in order to determine if the 
individual will maintain their clearance. These events, by themselves and depending on 
their severity, may not prevent employment or network access. The security evaluation 
process considers the overall trustworthiness of the person as a whole and granting a 
clearance is not necessarily determined by a single/isolated event. However, if a person 
receives and maintains a security clearance despite any reported or discovered issues, a 
SIEM can use these events and attach these potential security flags to a user.  
d. Incident Reporting 
This element also requires both CI and security professionals to coordinate 
their activities and efforts in order to “obtain records of security incidents, violations, 
suspicious incidents, and anomalies by DoD affiliated persons…” (Under Secretary of 
Defense [I], 2012). These items can also be used to tailor a SIEM rule to a specific user. 
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e. Information Assurance 
The previous elements stressed the importance of both CI professionals 
and personnel security professionals working together to combat the insider threat as part 
of the overall insider threat program. It is at this point that the document describes the 
need for CI, Security, Information Assurance, and Anti-terrorism/Force Protection 
personnel to share the responsibility for the mission of countering insider threats 
specifically related to CI (Under Secretary of Defense, 2012). This need is highly 
relevant to the goals of this paper. The overall objective is to integrate Personnel Security 
Investigations, potentially adverse administrative information, and other potential insider 
threat indicators into a profile for a user that can be used by a SIEM. Coordination and 
communication between the various personnel responsible for these items is necessary 
for this to work effectively. 
The previously described policies and definitions concerning insider 
threats will be used throughout this paper. In Chapter VII, sample SIEM rules tailored to 
user profiles will be used to demonstrate potential fulfillment of these policies and 
instructions. In order to better tailor these sample SIEM rules, we examine historical 
insider threats in an attempt to identify potential indicators for insider threats. The 
following section reviews historical insider threats within both the government and 
commercial sectors. 
B. INSIDER THREAT CATEGORIES 
Many organizations have conducted research into the insider threat and produced 
reports with their findings. One report the DoD produced is the DoD Insider Threat 
Mitigation Report. This report is dated from April 2000, but is still practical owing to its 
use of historic cases. The goal of the report is to “mitigate the insider threat to DoD 
information systems” (Information Assurance Technology Analysis Center, 2000, p. i). 
Some of the key findings of this report include the need to “strengthen personnel security 
and management practices,…detect problems,…and react/respond” (Information 
Assurance Technology Analysis Center, 2000, p. i).  
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The following section examines the four categories of insider threats as described 
in this report as well as their comparable definitions from the CERT Insider Threat 
Center. The CERT Insider Threat Center is part of the Software Engineering Institute 
located at Carnegie Mellon University. It is a research and development organization that 
receives funding from the U.S government. Its stated objective is to “assist organizations 
in preventing, detecting, and responding to insider compromises” (Capelli, et al., 2012). 
As part of its insider threat research, the CERT Insider Threat Center has conducted 
numerous studies and analyses of historic insider threat cases.  
1. Maliciousness and Intentional Abuse 
Maliciousness is described as an insider threat source “that results in compromise 
or destruction of information, or disruption of services to other insiders” (Information 
Assurance Technology Analysis Center, 2000, p. 6). This can be understood to be an 
intentional act by a person with knowledge of what the results of their acts will be. This 
person intends to cause these acts and conducts his activities to achieve these goals. This 
description is comparable to CERT’s intentional abuse insider threat category (Capelli et 
al., 2012). 
2. Disregard of Security Practices and Failure to Adhere to Policies 
For this definition, the compromise or destruction of information is a result of 
disregarding security practices and policies. Some examples include willfully storing 
classified information improperly, transmitting classified information improperly, and not 
providing required protection and control for classified information outside of controlled 
areas (Information Assurance Technology Analysis Center, 2000). The user in these 
examples may not have malicious intent, and any infraction may be the result of simple 
laziness rather than willful malice. But the end result is still that sensitive information 
could be compromised. The user has knowledge of the required security practices but 
actively chooses to not comply with those practices. This description is comparable to 
CERT’s description of the “failure to adhere to policies” category of insider threats 
(Capelli et al., 2012) 
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3. Carelessness and Unintentional Abuse 
Being careless with security procedures is a clear path to compromising 
information. This category from the DoD Insider Threat Mitigation report is comparable 
with CERT’s classification of unintentional abuse as an insider threat (Capelli et al., 
2012). The user did not intend to cause damage; but damage was caused. In the DoD 
sense of damage, carelessness as a source of insider threats generally, but not always, 
results in minimal damage (Information Assurance Technology Analysis Center, 2012).  
4. Ignorance and Unintentional Abuse 
For the “ignorance” category, the user was not being malicious, not willfully 
ignoring security practices, and not being careless with known security practices. The 
user simply did not know the applicable proper security practices and requirements. This 
can also be compared to CERT’s unintentional abuse classification (Capelli et al., 2012). 
This paper will focus on the first of these four insider threat categories: 
“maliciousness and intentional abuse” as described by CERT and DoD. While the other 
categories of insider threats can cause significant damage to an organization, or result in 
the compromise of critical information; there is an extra layer of difficulty in attempting 
to implement a correlation tool that can predict a user’s carelessness or ignorance and the 
likelihood of those characteristics progressing into a malicious insider threat type of 
situation.  
C. INSIDER THREAT MOTIVATIONS 
This section will examine the insider threat studies conducted by the Defense 
Personnel Security Research Center and the research studies conducted by CERT. The 
results will be summarized and examined in order to attempt to determine potential 
factors related to malicious and intentional abuse motivations that would be good 
candidates for incorporation into a SIEM rule.  
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1. Defense Personnel Security Research Center  
The Defense Personnel Security Research Center (PERSEREC) is a component of 
DoD. This organization produces a variety of products and reports related to DoD 
security clearance programs. The most significant two reports for the purpose of this 
paper are PERSEREC’s “Espionage and Other Compromises of National Security” and 
“Changes in Espionage by Americans: 1947–2007.”  
a. Espionage and Other Compromises of National Security 
The relevant results of this summary by PERSEREC show that the 
majority of the espionage cases were insiders and not external foreign agents (Defense 
Personnel Security Research Center, 2009). 
b. Changes in Espionage by Americans:  1947–2007 
This PERSEREC report specifically addresses the summary of insider 
threat data from 1947 through 2007. Its purpose is to show the changes in multiple factors 
related to American espionage from 1947 through 2007. The report breaks up the years 
analyzed into 1947 to 1979, 1980 to 1989, and events since 1990 (Herbig, 2007). The 
report provides multiple sources of data analysis that will be useful for attempting to 
discover factors or data that might be utilized by a SIEM rule for correlation and analysis. 
Table 1 shows a breakout of insider motivations separated by each of the three previously 
defined year groups. 
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Table 1.   Motivations for Individuals for Espionage (From Herbig, 2009, p. 32) 
Table 1 shows the clear leader in motivations for personnel conducting 
espionage from 1990 to 2007 is divided loyalties. Divided loyalties is defined by Herbig 
as “an allegiance to another country or cause in addition to the United States, a preference 
for interests other than the United States, and the possibility for the betrayal of American 
interests that divided loyalties could cause” (Herbig, 2009, p. 11). Divided loyalties are 
such an important potential risk factor that they are addressed during an employee’s PSI 
in four sections. These sections are “allegiance to the United States, foreign influence, 
foreign preference, and outside activities” (Herbig, 2009, p. 12).  
For the year group 1990 to 2007, of the 17 events identified as being 
motivated by divided loyalties, eight had divided loyalties as the sole motive. The 
proportion of events motivated by divided loyalties for which divided loyalties was the 
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sole motivation has increased over the years. . Interestingly, motivations due to money as 
the only motive appear to be declining in recent years; but motivations with money as the 
primary motive among other motives is still high.  
In addition to money and divided loyalties, the other significant motivators 
are employee disgruntlement and ingratiation. Disgruntlement is defined as “usually 
being caused by the person’s relationships or treatment in the workplace, and the 
associated desire to take revenge” (Herbig, 2009, p. 35). Ingratiation is the employee’s 
desire to increase their status in the eyes of their “spouse or other family member, a 
friend, or a handler…” (Herbig, 2009, p. 36).  
Based on Table 1’s summary of historic espionage data, extra (focused) 
consideration should be given to divided loyalties, financial considerations, and 
disgruntlement or ingratiation as potential motivators for insider threats. These factors are 
potentially identifiable elements that could be used to develop event inputs to rules for 
SIEM correlation and analysis. Foreign influence and financial issues can be discovered 
through background investigations during a PSI. Disgruntlement can potentially be 
discovered during a PSI with investigations of previous supervisors as well as with 
records of adverse administrative actions. However, the ability to identify an insider 
motivated by ingratiation—the desire to increase their status in the opinion of others—
might be difficult to assess based on PSI’s or administrative actions, and will thus not be 
included as a targeted behavior/metric for SIEM insider threat cueing.  
2. CERT/Secret Service Insider Threat Studies  
CERT and the United States Secret Service have collaborated to produce reports 
concerning the insider threat. Several of their reports are highlighted and summarized in 
this section. The sectors focused on in these CERT reports concerning the insider threat 
are critical infrastructure, banking and finance, information technology and 
communications, and government.  
These reports were released over a several year period and the summaries below 
are taken from the research summaries presented in the released papers. As specific cases 
were not delineated in the presented research, it is not known if some of the cases overlap 
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between the released studies. It is also unknown if some of the insider threat cases 
overlap (or are the same as) the cases presented in the previously addressed PERSEREC 
reports. However, the intent of presenting these summaries, whether or not cases are 
replicated or overlap, is to obtain an overview of some of the basic motivational 
characteristics of insider threats. 
a. CERT’s Computer System Sabotage in Critical Infrastructure 
Sectors  
The most important section of this study in relation to this paper is the 
section summarizing the majority of the motives for the insiders as part of the key 
findings. CERT researchers found that a “negative work-related event triggered most 
[malicious] insiders’ actions” (Keeney et al., 2005, p. 14) and that “most [malicious] 
insider’s held a work related grievance prior to the incident” (Keeney et al., 2005, p. 14). 
Figure 1 shows the breakout of the majority of the motivational factors for insiders in this 
report.  
 
Figure 1.  CERT Critical Infrastructure Insider Motivations  



















b. CERT’s Illicit Cyber Activity in the Banking and Finance Sector  
Similar to the above study, this research by CERT also produced key 
findings related to the possible motivations of the insiders. CERT’s findings show that 
most of the insiders were motivated by some sort of financial gain (Randazzo, Keeney, 
Kowalski, Cappelli, & Moore, 2004). These results, skewed toward a financial 
motivation, which might be related to the fact that the insiders were working within the 
financial industry. The motivations from CERT’s research are depicted in Figure 2. 
 
 
Figure 2.  CERT Banking and Finance Insider Motivations  






















c. CERT’s Illicit Cyber Activity in the Government Sector  
CERT’s insider threat study in January of 2008 focused on government 
employee insider threats. Figure 3 depicts the summary of motivations from this study. 
Given that the data from this study used in Figure 3 does not address divided loyalties, 
the questions asked by CERT during their data collection process may not have focused 
on this motivation for insider threats (Kowalski et al., 2008). 
 




















d. CERT’s Illicit Cyber Activity in the Information Technology and 
Telecommunications Sector 
Also in January of 2008, CERT released their research concerning insider 
threats inside information technology and telecommunications sectors based on their 
collected cases (Moore, Kowalski, & Cappelli, 2008). The summaries of their findings 
concerning the insiders’ motivations are depicted in Figure 4. 
 
 


























e. CERT Summaries 
The previous reports from CERT provide wide-scope coverage of a 
multitude of historic insider threat cases. In addition to the motivating factors described 
in the previous sections, these studies also summarized the insiders who had previous 
arrests prior to the insider incidents and who had come to the attention of either their 
supervisors or co-workers for some type of adverse workplace behavioral incident. 
Approximately one third of the insiders for each of the sector summaries had a previous 
arrest in their background. Also, a significant percentage of the insiders for each sector 
summary had one or more non-positive workplace incidents that brought their behavior to 
the attention of their supervisors or co-workers. Figure 5 summarizes these incidents 
according to the type of CERT report. 
 
 
Figure 5.  CERT Previous Arrests and Behavior Attention Summaries  
(After Keeney et al., 2004, Randazzo et al., 2005,  



















D. SUMMARY OF POTENTIAL INDICATORS FOR INSIDER THREATS 
As previously discussed, there has been much research conducted on insider 
threats. The need for insider threat prevention is obvious, but the ability to prevent or 
even detect insider threats is a difficult endeavor. Employee background indicators can 
possibly play a role in developing a SIEM rule that would enable automated warnings or 
detections based upon logical correlations among these indicators.  
In the PERSEREC reports, three of the most important factors to consider when 
attempting to predict insider threat activities are: divided loyalties, finances, and 
disgruntlement. In the CERT summaries, the most important factors to consider are: 
employee motivations for financial gain, employee disgruntlement and/or desire for 
revenge due to a variety of workplace factors. Additionally, employees who have had 
previous arrests or have come to the attention of their supervisors or co-workers for non-
positive workplace behaviors, is also a significant factor for the malicious insider in the 
CERT reports. While any of these factors alone are not definite predictors of a malicious 
insider, they can be “weighted” and used as indications and warnings that additional 
attention and scrutiny are warranted. Most of the motivations summarized above   are (or 
should be) addressed in a military person’s PSI. Workplace behavioral factors as well as 
documented administrative actions concerning a given employee’s behaviors can both be 
addressed in the employee’s PSI. This will be described in detail in the following chapter. 
The data described above can be used as potential events for constructing SIEM 
rules tailored to users for potential insider threat identification. The following list 
summarizes the best candidate factors from the PERSEREC and CERT reports to 
consider in constructing an insider threat SIEM rule: 
 Divided loyalties/foreign influence 
 Financial difficulties 
 Disgruntlement/workplace behavior 
 Arrest history 
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The following chapter will describe the Navy’s PSI process as well as typical 
administrative actions that might facilitate the collection of the above data in order to 
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V. PERSONNEL SECURITY INFORMATION, 
ADMINISTRATIVE ACTIONS, AND ACCOUNT CREATION 
A. DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY PERSONNEL SECURITY 
INVESTIGATIONS 
In order for a candidate employee to successfully achieve employment at most 
DoD components, she must voluntarily submit detailed facts about her life. This 
background information is used to make decisions about an employee’s suitability for 
certain positions. If an employee cannot successfully pass this initial background 
investigation, they may not be considered for certain DoD positions, or they may not be 
considered for any position within the DON. The DON Clearance Adjudication Facility 
(DONCAF) is the entity responsible for this process within the DON (Secretary of the 
Navy, 2006). The following sections will provide a brief overview of this process and 
highlight how information already collected during a background investigation can be 
used to tailor a SIEM rule to a user (or groups of users).  
1. Types of Personnel Security Investigations 
The Navy’s Personnel Security manual describes several types of PSIs for 
personnel depending on their job duties. The basic PSI is the National Agency Check 
(NAC). This “check” includes fingerprint searches, FBI criminal file searches, and other 
agencies such as Immigration and Naturalization Services to determine if there is any 
detrimental information on the specific person being investigated. This is used as the 
basis for the other, more detailed PSIs (Secretary of the Navy, 2006). The next level up is 
the National Agency Check with Written Inquiries (NACI). This is the NAC with written 
requests for information to a person’s employers/supervisors, schools, etc. (Secretary of 
the Navy, 2006).  
Another example PSI is the National Agency Check with Local Agency and 
Credit Checks (NACLC). As the name suggests, this is the NAC with additional credit 
checks and inquiries to local, not federal, law enforcement entities where the person 
under investigation has lived. The NACLC is the basis for determining military 
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suitability for Navy and Marine Corps military personnel, both enlisted and officers. This 
is considered to be the “standard for determinations of eligibility to access Confidential 
and Secret classified national security information” (Secretary of the Navy, 2006,  
p. 6–2). For more sensitive positions, more in-depth PSIs are conducted, such as the 
Single Scope Background Investigation and other specialized PSIs. However, as the 
NACLC is more applicable to the majority of Navy and Marine Corps service members, 
the NACLC will be used as the model for data collection for this research. The NACLC 
is required for all enlisted members of the Navy and Marine Corps upon their initial entry 
into military service and is also required for all officers, warrant officers, midshipmen, 
and ROTC members prior to receiving their appointments (Secretary of the Navy, 2006, 
p. 6–7). In short, the NACLC is required, at least initially, for all service members in the 
Navy and Marines.  
2. Recurring Requirements 
The NACLC is considered to be a valid PSI for a period of ten years. It must be 
updated every 10 to 15 years (Secretary of the Navy, 2006, p. 6–6) in order for the 
military personnel to be able to maintain their access to confidential or secret 
information. (Members requiring higher accesses are required to have investigations 
every five years.) This is obviously a significant period during which much can change in 
a person’s life. Factors that influence or trigger malicious insider activity can easily arise 
during this expansive time frame.  
In addition to this time frequency, new direction has been provided as to the 
provision of these PSIs due to the recent federal budget sequester of 2013. Three 
categories of PSI are no longer authorized until further information is received, at least 
until after September 30, 2013 (Under Secretary of the Navy, 2013). SSBI-Periodic 
Reinvestigations (PR), Secret PRs using NACLCs, and requests for expedited 
investigations, are the three non-mission critical PSI submissions no longer authorized 
(Under Secretary of the Navy, 2013) unless under specific circumstances or needs as 
described in this recent memorandum. The temporary cessation of these periodic 
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“checkups” increases the potential risk of military personnel maintaining access when 
they might have had that access removed for cause during a normal reinvestigation cycle.  
3. Investigation Process  
The process a Navy or Marine Corps serviceman or woman goes through in order 
to comply with the PSI information submission requirements, is to fill out the Standard 
Form 86, Questionnaire for National Security Positions (U.S. Office of Personnel 
Management, 2010). This form asks basic questions that will eventually contribute to the 
determination of the applicant’s eligibility for national security positions. The form is 
submitted to the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) and the background 
information provided is used to drive the NACLC (or other type of PSI). OPM provides 
investigative services for all PSIs within DoD (Secretary of the Navy, 2006). OPM 
conducts their investigations based on the information provided and then forwards the 
results of their investigations to DONCAF. Upon reviewing the results from OPM, 
DONCAF determines whether or not a person is eligible for access to the requested level 
of clearance (Secretary of the Navy, 2006).  
4. SF-86 Personnel Security Investigation Questions 
As previously described, the SF-86 is the standard form used for most security 
investigations within the Navy and Marine Corps and requires specific data from users to 
assist in making an overall clearance and position eligibility decision. The SF-86 requires 
applicants to submit information on their previous employment, previous residences, 
foreign influences, financial situations, previous arrests, drug and alcohol use, and many 
more similar type questions. These questions gather information that is directly related to 
three of the four insider threat factors identified in the previous chapter. These factors are 
divided loyalties/foreign influence, financial difficulties, and arrest history. The fourth 
factor, disgruntlement, might be discoverable through administrative actions which will 
be discussed later in this chapter. Sections of the SF-86 require reporting any previous 
firings or administrative action from previous employers (U.S. Office of Personnel 
Management, 2010). These might indicate a predilection towards employee workplace 
issues. Personnel may have multiple items on their SF-86 that might trigger further 
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investigations or cause for concern, but that person can still receive a security clearance if 
these items are not determined to be serious enough to prevent receipt of a security 
clearance. Eligibility is determined by common sense and the “whole person” concept 
(Secretary of the Navy, 2006, p. 7–1). However, this direction to use common sense and 
evaluate the entirety of the person and her past behavior in determining security 
eligibility implies subjectivity. Individuals granted eligibility by DONCAF can possibly 
still become insider threats. SIEM rules using collected personnel data can potentially 
assist insider threat detection by monitoring a person’s network behavior and possibly 
flagging events of concern.  
5. Joint Personnel Adjudication System and the Automated Continuing 
Evaluation System 
The status and eventual results of the investigation can be accessed via the Joint 
Personnel Adjudication System (JPAS), a web-based application for security managers. 
This allows local security managers the ability to look up a person’s clearance eligibility, 
status of his current investigation, when the next investigation is due, if non-disclosure 
forms have been signed, and other related security management items (Secretary of the 
Navy, 2006). Answers to an applicant’s submitted questionnaire can be viewed through 
JPAS if the local security manager has the appropriate permissions on their JPAS access 
account (JPAS, 2013). However, if the user already has a completed security clearance on 
file on JPAS, the specific results of the questionnaire are not as easily accessed.  
Once a clearance level has been approved for an applicant, the applicant must 
apply to both DONCAF and OPM in order to request a copy of the completed 
investigation, which should include the applicant’s responses to the SF-86 questions 
(Naval Criminal Investigative Service, 2013). Unfortunately, “copies of submitted SF-
86’s are not maintained electronically in the format in which they were submitted” 
(Naval Criminal Investigative Service, 2013). Not maintaining these records in an easily 
accessible format for security managers is one of the barriers that must be overcome in 
order to effectively use an applicant’s responses as potential inputs to a SIEM insider 
threat rule.  
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In the future, JPAS will eventually be replaced by a program that will also include 
continuous evaluation. This system is known as the Defense Information System for 
Security (DISS) and will include a technology called Automated Records Check. The 
Automated Records Check in development should provide “more cost effective and 
timely solutions to obtain commercial and federal records to support investigations” 
(JPAS, 2013). The Automated Records Check will feed the Automated Continuing 
Evaluation System (ACES), which will be a part of the DISS family of systems (JPAS, 
2013).   
ACES will provide a “fully-automated process to query applicant data against 
appropriate government and commercial databases to collect, analyze, and validate 
clearance data in order to produce reports that flag potential issues” (JPAS, 2013). The 
goal is to gain both more fidelity of information, and more frequency of information on 
personnel who have clearances in order to decrease the threat posed by missing security-
related information that might arise during the lengthy periods of clearance 
reinvestigations. ACES is a tool developed by PERSEREC and first used in a beta test 
from August 2004 to February 2005, in which it checked over 12,000 individuals holding 
TS/SCI clearances in between their periodic reinvestigations (Defense Personnel Security 
Research Center, 2013). As ACES has progressed in its development, it can now audit 
over 40 databases for items of potential security concern regarding cleared individuals 
and is currently being used in several pilot programs to evaluate the capabilities of the 
Automated Records Checks (Defense Personnel Security Research Center, 2013) and will 
be incorporated into DISS when DISS is projected to replace JPAS in FY2016 (JPAS, 
2013).  
6. Continuous Evaluation and Reporting Obligations 
As there is a significant time gap between clearance reviews and re-investigations, 
recipients of a security clearance are required to report any changes in their status that 
might affect their security clearance. The command security officer is designated as 
responsible for coordinating this continuous evaluation of eligibility for personnel 
(Secretary of the Navy, 2006, p. 2–4). Some of these mandatory reporting requirements 
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are changes in marital status, arrests, close and continuing contact with foreign nationals, 
foreign travel, bankruptcies, etc. (U.S. Office of Personnel Management, 2010).  
As previously described, DoD is testing and using the ACES tool to assist in 
discovering security related items that individuals may fail to report as required. ACES 
will automatically query government and commercial databases that maintain persons’ 
financial, foreign, and criminal issues (Secretary of the Navy, 2006, p. 10–5). However, if 
a person with a security clearance fails to self-report these items, either through ignorance 
or purposeful neglect, or these items are not accessible in a database queried by ACES; 
these items will not be discovered until that person’s next periodic reinvestigation. ACES 
is not intended to replace the Navy’s continuous evaluation and reporting requirements 
program (Secretary of the Navy, 2006, p. 10–5).  
PERSEREC describes one of the possible future uses of ACES to trigger 
“expanded investigations when it detects new issues” (Defense Personnel Security 
Research Center, 2013). This could potentially be used as input for a SIEM rule to 
specifically look for an individual’s network activity related to the ACES discovery. This 
would be similar to using an individual’s SF-86 information as inputs to SIEM rules. 
How ACES will actually be utilized with the enhanced Automated Records Check within 
the new DISS will determine how information discovered during its queries can be used 
for SIEM rules or watch lists. Information collected during the PSI process, and possibly 
during ACES queries, can be used for rules tailored to a specific user. This can 
potentially augment the continuous evaluation process required by the Navy. 
B. NAVY ADMINISTRATIVE ACTIONS  
With any organization, there are numerous administrative actions required in 
response to an employee’s actions or offenses. These administrative actions could 
potentially be used to identify employees who might be at risk of evolving into insider 
threats. There are a variety of options available to a commander. They include counseling 
and nonpunitive censure, nonjudicial punishment, and courts-martial (Judge Advocate 
General, 2012).  
 41
There are many specific options available to a commander under each of the main 
categories and each option may result in documentation potentially useful for SIEM 
inclusion. In the following section, counseling and nonjudicial punishment will be 
examined in order to highlight how information resulting from these actions could be 
incorporated as input to a SIEM for preventing or discovering insider threats related to 
potential disgruntlement.  
1. Counseling  
Counseling is “intended to give a member the opportunity to improve by 
identifying specific, undesirable behavior, which the member must alter or cease” 
(Deputy Chief of Naval Personnel, 2009, p. 1910–202). Counseling is a broad category 
that can be conducted verbally or in a written format. Verbal counseling is not 
documented and is not useful for consideration as a possible data point for inclusion into 
a SIEM for the purposes of this research. Formal counseling can be documented in an 
individual’s service record utilizing NAVPERS form 1070/613 Administrative Remarks, 
commonly referred to as a Page 13 entry. This entry is used to document a variety of 
items, both positive and negative, for a service member.  
One example of counseling that could result in a Page 13 entry into an 
individual’s service record is an individual’s failure to pass the Navy’s required physical 
fitness assessments. If a service member fails to meet the minimum standards three times 
within a four-year period, then the service member will be processed for administrative 
separation from the Navy (Chief of Naval Operations, 2011). If an individual has 
multiple failures and is close to being considered for administrative separation, this might 
be an item to include on a SIEM watch list or rule for that individual. An individual close 
to being administratively separated might become disgruntled, one of the possible 
indications of insider threat as discussed in previous chapters.  
While there may be nothing else to indicate the person is disgruntled, being 
separated from employment is a traumatic event and should invite further scrutiny of that 
person’s activities as a preventive measure in case of actual disgruntlement. A 
precautionary measure would be to use this information as part of that person’s overall 
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profile utilized by a SIEM in order for the SIEM to monitor for potentially suspicious 
activity by that person. Documenting physical fitness failures is just one of numerous 
administrative remarks in a service member’s record that can potentially be used as part 
of a SIEM.  
2. Nonjudicial Punishment 
Nonjudicial punishment (NJP)—also known as Captain’s Mast, Article 15, or 
Office hours depending on the service branch—can be used, depending on the 
circumstances, instead of courts-martial (Judge Advocate General, 2012). This is not a 
criminal trial but it is a disciplinary proceeding designed for minor misconduct (Judge 
Advocate General, 2012). There are many personal actions/infractions that can result in 
nonjudicial punishment. Despite the offense or punishment received, there will be a 
service record entry using the NAVPERS form 1070/613 Administrative Remarks (Judge 
Advocate General, 2012). Since NJP can adversely impact an individual’s career, it is 
another potential SIEM cueing item that could be correlated to indicate possible 
disgruntlement. 
The preceding items recorded in an individual’s service record are just a few of 
many possible administrative actions that could be incorporated into a SIEM to monitor 
for potential insider threat activity. However, some of these items might not be 
considered for an individual’s clearance or allowed accesses until the individual’s 
reinvestigation; unless specified by the commander, or if the nonjudicial punishment was 
directly related to a security incident or violation.  
These administrative actions can be taken into consideration for the overall 
security clearance determination as they might serve as motivators for potential 
disgruntlement. However, the significant time gap between investigations leaves a period 
within which a potentially disgruntled employee might develop into a malicious insider 
with no SIEM-observable warning indicators. Including these administrative items for 
SIEM monitoring might assist in discovering these threats during the long intervals 
between security clearance investigations. The current method by which individuals can 
receive a network account within Navy commands should also be examined in order to 
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determine possible ways a command might be able to use the previously described 
information from both the SF-86 and administrative actions. 
C. SYSTEM ACCOUNT ACCESS REQUEST  
When an individual first check’s into a Navy command, there is typically a 
standard check-in process. The individual will receive a command check-in sheet, which 
she must take to the command’s various departmental representatives. These 
departmental representatives will provide the new check-in with necessary information 
concerning the command and then sign the individual’s check-in sheet. One of the key 
items for a newcomer is to receive necessary system accesses in order to conduct the 
duties of their position. This person may require multiple accounts and accesses with 
varying classifications depending on their responsibilities. In order for the new check-in 
to receive network access or accounts, she will fill typically out the System Authorization 
Access Request-Navy (SAAR-N) OPNAV 5239/14 form. This form collects a variety of 
information on the new check-in in order to provide system access. There are four parts 
to this form. 
1. SAAR-N Part I 
Part I gathers basic information such as the employee’s name, department, job 
title, phone number, etc. It also includes checkboxes for the employee’s citizenship and 
whether she is military, civilian, or contractor, and whether information assurance 
training has been completed. Part I of the SAAR-N is shown in Figure 6: 
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Figure 6.  From SAAR-N (OPNAV 5239/14, 2011) Part I 
2. SAAR-N Part II 
The first section of Part II includes a section for justification of access, type of 
access required, classification of access required, supervisor’s information and 
supervisor’s verification of the employee’s need to know. The remainder of Part II 
includes a detailed user consent agreement which the user signs. The user’s signature 
indicates they will adhere to the policies and also consent to monitoring. The first section 
of Part II of the SAAR-N form is shown in Figure 7: 
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Figure 7.  From SAAR-N (OPNAV 5239/14, 2011) Part II 
3. SAAR-N Part III 
Part III is for use by the security manager and requires a signature indicating the 
type of background investigation and clearance information concerning the applicant. 
The security manager will enter the type of investigation (NACLC, SSBI, etc.), the date 
of investigation, the clearance level the individual has, and the IT level designation of 
that individual. The IT level is used to determine special privileges the applicant might 
require depending on their required duties. Level I indicates privileged access, Level II 
indicates limited privilege with sensitive information access, and Level III indicates no 
privilege and no sensitive information access (Secretary of the Navy, 2006). Part III is 
shown in Figure 8. 
 
Figure 8.   From SAAR-N (OPNAV 5239/14, 2011) Part III 
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4. SAAR-N Part IV 
Part IV is used to identify the specific accesses an individual may require as part 
of their job duties. SAAR-N Part IV is shown in Figure 9. 
 
 
Figure 9.  From SAAR-N (OPNAV 5239/14, 2011) Part IV 
5. SAAR-N Summary 
Parts III and IV of the SAAR-N are potentially areas where more detailed 
information about the user might be included for use by a SIEM. For example, in Part III, 
instead of only listing the investigation completed and the clearance level, there might be 
a section to include some of the individual’s responses to SF-86 questions that might be 
considered as having an extra risk for that individual becoming an insider threat. It could 
also be a place to list administrative actions received by that individual. These questions 
and administrative actions could be related to the potential precursors of insider threats 
previously examined in Chapter III, foreign influence/divided loyalties, financial 
difficulties, disgruntlement, and previous arrests. 
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While the investigative process determined the eligibility for the individual to 
receive a clearance to obtain certain accesses, this would be a way extract more detailed 
information about the individual in order to incorporate that person’s data into a SIEM 
watch list or rule. For example, if a person has SF-86 responses indicating previous 
financial difficulties, that could be listed on the SAAR-N in some format and the system 
administrator or commander would be able to use that information to add that person’s 
name or user account to a SIEM watch list. This watch list would then be used with 
SIEM rules to monitor that person’s network activities for a variety of activities that 
might indicate potential insider threat type activities.  
D. SUMMARY 
Data is gathered and recorded during military Personnel Security Investigations 
and administrative actions that can potentially provide details useful for a SIEM to 
monitor for malicious insider activities. While the specific data from an individual’s SF-
86 is currently difficult to access, it might be possible to include specific responses to SF-
86 questions related to potential insider threat indicators as part of that person’s JPAS 
entry for use by the local command security manager. This would allow for the data to be 
in a centralized location accessible by each command security officer responsible for that 
individual. Additionally, administrative actions recorded in an individual’s service record 
can provide information useful for SIEM monitoring, especially in cases of potential 
employee disgruntlement.  
The process might work in the following manner:  When an employee checks into 
a command, a modified type of the SAAR-N could include areas for the command 
security officer to list potential insider threat flags produced by the SF-86 questions and 
documented in the individual’s JPAS file. Administrative personnel might list 
documented administrative actions from the individual’s service record. These items 
could then be used by personnel responsible for approving the SAAR-N to develop a user 
profile based on this information. This profile could be used for watch lists and rules with 
a SIEM to enhance a command’s ability to prevent and discover malicious insiders.  
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In order for this process to function, there would need to be SIEM rules developed 
that would specify what types of activity should be monitored. It is unlikely that any 
combination of rules, however well chosen and logically combined, will be able to 
capture all the ways in which an insider could possibly cause damage. However, by 
identifying individuals with backgrounds containing potential indicators as previously 
described, and applying SIEM rules to those individuals, alerts can be designed to inform 
designated personnel of an individual’s network activities that may indicate potential 
malicious activities. These network activities may not be singularly indicative of a 
malicious insider, but, when taken in conjunction with background factors, they may 
require further investigation to prevent or discover malicious insider activity.  
One malicious insider activity, specifically within the U.S. military, is the release 
of information, classified or unclassified, outside of the military’s control without proper 
authorization. Sample data extraction methods by malicious insiders will be examined in 
the following chapter. These methods can be incorporated into a SIEM rule or rules for 
monitoring previously identified users. 
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VI. SELECTION OF CANDIDATE EVENTS FOR SIEM CUEING 
A. DATA EXFILTRATION METHODS AND LOG EVENT SOURCES FOR 
SIEM CORRELATION 
Understanding the variety of ways in which an insider can cause damage to any 
organization is an important component of combatting the insider threat. One potentially 
devastating way an insider can threaten or attack an organization is to steal information. 
For the military and U.S. government, this information can range from classified to 
unclassified data. However, regardless of the classification of the data, every portion of 
data stolen or otherwise obtained by an insider provides potential advantage to an 
adversary. This data compromise can lead to economic damage, political damage, and 
even deaths of military or other government operators. 
Recognizing the ways in which data can leave an organization without 
authorization, can assist in developing SIEM rules to generate alerts or warnings if some 
of these data extraction activities are observed. The following will briefly describe some 
of the ways that an insider can remove data from an organization.  
1. Printing 
An historic example of printers being used in insider espionage is the case of 
Robert Chaegun Kim, a computer specialist working for the DON at the Office of Naval 
Intelligence. Kim was formerly a citizen of South Korea, prior to becoming a U.S. 
citizen. Kim used his insider access at ONI to find classified documents, delete the 
classification markings, and then print them out to mail to his South Korean contacts 
(Defense Personnel Security Research Center, 2009). Another example is the case of 
Leandro Aragoncillo, a naturalized U.S. citizen from the Philippines. Aragoncillo used 
his insider access while working at the FBI as an intelligence analyst to pass classified 
information to the Philippine government. He would search the FBI files, then download 
and print out documents concerning the Philippines (Defense Personnel Security 
Research Center, 2009).  
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Most organizations, whether commercial, government, or military, allow insider 
usage of printing facilities. This is an obvious necessity in order for the users to conduct 
their day-to-day activities in fulfillment of their employment requirements. There are two 
common ways in which an organization can configure its printing services for its users. A 
printer can be directly connected to a user’s workstation for their sole use or a printer can 
be configured on a network for many users to share.  
For cost saving purposes, it is generally most efficient to have a shared printer. 
Depending on the size of the organization, the segregation of shared printers might be 
conducted by work function, location, or other factors. A user with a dedicated printer 
might have specialty functions that require sole usage of the printer or the user might be 
in some sort of elevated position within the organization where they need their own 
printer and cannot afford to share the printing service with others.  
Most modern printers contain logging capabilities that record activities such as 
user, time accessed, pages printed, file names, and other data fields depending on the 
printer manufacturer or on the fields set by the installer or network administrator. 
Connecting a shared printer to a SIEM to collect, aggregate, and normalize these logs 
would allow for continuous monitoring of user’s printing activities. Connecting dedicated 
printers would also provide this function, but it might be more cost-effective for an 
organization to begin with shared printers as this facilitates printer monitoring for a 
greater number of users. However, there is still a risk that individuals with dedicated 
printers might find it easier to conduct illicit printing activities, without the fear of 
observation, if the printer is not networked with other users. Certain aspects of the shared 
printing services can be input into the SIEM rule for correlation or alerts (Holloway & 
Santiago, 2012) depending on the organization, but it is important to have a general idea 
of what the baseline, or normal, printer usage is prior to implementing these SIEM rules 
in order to reduce false positives.  
a. Time of Use 
Time of use of the printing service can be significant in detecting potential 
insider threats (Holloway & Santiago, 2012). If a user is printing after hours, it might be 
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that the user is attempting to avoid co-workers or supervisors from directly observing 
what he is printing. This insider could be: just working after hours on official tasks, 
simply abusing the printer for personal use, or potentially printing out sensitive data for 
extraction or exploitation.  
b. Quantity of Use 
Large amounts of print jobs for a particular insider might be another 
metric to cue a SIEM alert on (Holloway & Santiago, 2012). A sudden increase in the 
volume of pages or of files sent to a printer by a particular user might be one factor that, 
once correlated with other information, might indicate a potential insider.  
c. Types of Files 
The types of files sent to a printer by a user can indicate potential insider 
threats in several ways. If a user is sending files to the printer that are outside the normal 
scope of that user’s job responsibilities, that could be viewed as an indicator (Holloway 
& Santiago, 2012). If a user prints out databases, slides, word documents or excel 
documents, depending on their job responsibilities, those could also be indicators. This 
level of detail for printer usage would probably best be used as a correlating factor for a 
SIEM rule. For example, if a user’s background data shows connections to a foreign 
country, and then that user is found to be printing files related to that foreign country; this 
is likely worthy of added investigative attention. 
2. Copiers 
An organization’s copy machine can also be used in a similar manner to a printer 
for potential identification of malicious activities. A copy machine is capable of 
recording and generating logs with similar fields as a printer; which can also be delivered 
to a SIEM for further analysis. Unfortunately, many copy machines currently in use do 
not employ identity-based access controls that would be able to provide a user identity in 
conjunction with any given copy job. Additionally, some copy machines are not network 
capable, which precludes the forwarding of log data to a SIEM. For example, David 
Sheldon Boon, an Army signals analyst for NSA, used a handheld scanner to copy 
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classified documents that he later passed to the Soviets (Defense Personnel Security 
Research Center, 2009).  
a. Time of Use 
Like the printer, the time when a copy machine is used might be a cue for 
further investigation, or at least as an input for correlation against other tripwires or 
indicators. Baselines should also be understood in order to reduce false positives. 
b. Quantity of Use 
Large increases in copy machine usage in volume of pages or files could 
be used to indicate insider threat activity as previously discussed in regards to printer 
usage. 
c. Types of Files 
Depending on the type of copy machine in use by an organization, the 
types of files copied may or may not be available or supported. The log fields for a copy 
machine may not differentiate between documents, spreadsheets, slide shows, or images 
reproduced.  
3. E-mails 
Most commercial, government, and military users incorporate e-mail activities as 
crucial components of their day-to-day employment activities. Quick communication is 
necessary for the smooth flow of an organization’s established processes. However, like 
most other services, e-mail capabilities can be exploited by malicious users (Capelli et al., 
2012). One historic example of using e-mails for malicious activity is the case of John 
Reece Roth, a University of Tennessee professor of plasma physics. He was charged with 
relaying sensitive information to China, and in one instance had sensitive files e-mailed 
to him while in China (Defense Personnel Security Research Center, 2009).  
Depending on an organization’s e-mail policies, there are ways in which a user’s 
e-mail usage can provide indicators as to potential or actual insider threat activities. 
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a. E-mail Destinations 
Depending on the job function of a government or military employee, they 
will typically send e-mails with the .gov or .mil domains during the normal course of 
their business. Employees dealing with contracts, research, education, or a variety of 
other activities will obviously interact with more domains than these two; so, again, the 
importance of establishing a baseline for normal behavior is emphasized in order to 
reduce false-positives. Just sending e-mails to other domains is by no means any sort of 
indicator of maliciousness; but if correlated with other activities, it might be something a 
SIEM rule should generate an alert for (Holloway & Santiago, 2012).  
b. E-mail Attachments 
Employees typically send attachments to others via e-mail as a normal part 
of their workday. However, if an employee is sending attachments to web-based e-mail 
services or to any potentially suspicious recipients, this might be indicative of data or 
information leaving the organization without proper oversight (Capelli et al., 2012). Also, 
there may be network policies or restrictions in place that restrict the size of outgoing 
attachments. If this is the case, the frequency of the e-mails might be an indicator of 
malicious activity if an employee is attempting to split up a file in order to exfiltrate the 
entire amount without tripping network policy size restrictions. 
c. Frequency of E-mail 
Massive amounts of e-mail to specific locations might be a tripwire for 
further investigation by security personnel (Holloway & Santiago, 2012). There could be 
official reasons for this activity; but there could also be the possibility of the employee 
abusing the organization’s network for either personal use or for malicious activity. If the 
employee also has previous flags on their user profile in regards to their PSI or 
administrative action, this should warrant further investigation. This further investigation 
can be programmed into the SIEM for issuing alerts and e-mail notices to appropriate 
personnel for action. 
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d. Time of E-mail 
Depending on an employee’s position and job requirements, the time of e-
mails might be indicative of malicious events (Holloway & Santiago, 2012). This is 
another example of a potential indicator that requires a refined baseline in order to 
prevent false positives For example, if the e-mail server logs show an employee is 
sending e-mails after hours; it could indicate several possibilities. The employee might 
simply be working late on their job requirements, the employee might be using company 
e-mail for personal purposes, or the employee might be trying to exfiltrate data without 
supervisors or co-workers looking over their shoulders during the day and observing their 
activities. These are just a few of the numerous reasons an employee might be sending 
innocuous e-mails after hours. But, if this activity adds to a set of indicators, the 
aggregate should trigger further investigation.  
4. Web Posts 
Web postings by employees in this case means any time an employee is posting 
information to public websites. This could mean commenting on news articles on 
websites such as CNN, commenting on opinion blogs, posting pictures or other files to 
public sites, etc. This could also mean transferring information to a password-protected 
website (Capelli et al., 2012). Monitoring this activity would most likely be difficult 
using a SIEM, especially if a user is conducting most of their posting activities to a social 
network site such as Facebook. However, a SIEM rule could be made that will alert on 
excessive usage of some of the well-known sites, which might cause a supervisor to 
conduct further analysis of their employees’ on-line activities. In addition to monitoring 
the frequency of these sites, the SIEM could be used to monitor on file sizes leaving the 
organization’s network. 
5. Cloud Services 
With the massive increase in data storage capacity offerings by commercial 
providers, the ability to access data in the “cloud” has greatly increased as well. Many 
services, such as Amazon Simple Storage Service (S3), offer free accounts with up to 
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5 GB of free storage (Amazon Web Services, 2013). Regardless of the type of cloud 
service used, there can be potential for abuse as an exfiltration tool for malicious insiders. 
Blocking these cloud services to users might be the simplest solution, but there 
might be some instances where employees need to use some of these public cloud 
services as part of their job requirements. In either case, SIEM rule elements could 
include domain names associated with cloud providers/services for select users whose 
previous behavior, as documented on their PSI or administrative actions, indicates they 
are deserving of added scrutiny. 
6. Chat Services 
Chat services are another way a malicious insider might use to leak data outside 
of the normal oversight channels. However, this might be extremely difficult to detect 
with a SIEM as the postings inside chat sessions are generally short and short-lived. But, 
if an employee is using chat and that is not required as part of their job duties, this could 
also be used to trip a SIEM rule for further investigation. 
B. SUMMARY OF CANDIDATE EVENTS FOR SIEM CUEING 
The data exfiltration methods and related log sources described above are just a 
few of the many possible ways data might leave an organization without appropriate 
authorizations. Incorporating these methods into a SIEM rule can potentially assist an 
organization in cueing for malicious insider threat activities. Applying these rules to user 
accounts that have previously defined flags related to previous PSI information and 
administrative actions can assist in increasing the fidelity of the system monitoring as 
described in some of the previous examples. Specific SIEM watch list and rule examples 
related to potential insider threat indicators and data exfiltration methods will be 
examined in the following chapter in order to highlight the actual watch list and rule 
creation process.  
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VII. SIEM ARCHITECTURE 
A. DETER, PREVENT, DETECT, AND CORRECT 
The implementation of a SIEM at a Navy command should address four basic 
goals as the end state of the SIEM working process as applied to the insider threat. These 
goals are to deter, prevent, detect and correct.  
1. Deter 
The first goal is to deter the insider threat via fear of discovery and punishment. 
Command security policies and training can all assist in reaching this goal. Some degree 
of deterrence would be expected owing solely to the knowledge of the existence of a 
SIEM capability within the command’s network architecture. So if, during the command 
check-in process, an individual is made aware that their background data is being used in 
conjunction with their network activities, this might be deterrence enough for some 
individuals. Knowing that their specific background data is included in a monitoring 
process might influence some individuals enough to not conduct any suspicious network 
activities that might draw management attention. Others, however, may be sufficiently 
motivated to risk detection and punishment and thus preventive measures would be the 
next line of defense. 
2. Prevent 
Prevention in this context refers to either a) the ability of a SIEM to potentially 
identify indications of an individual leaning towards becoming an insider threat, or b) 
early detection of insider actions that are preliminary to an actual damaging attack, but 
which are detected and countered prior to suffering any such damage. An example of this 
later issue (b) would be data intended for exfiltration, which is moved from a more secure 
server (perhaps inaccessible from the Internet) to a server directly accessible from the 
Internet. Design of a SIEM architecture that can monitor and record predefined activities 
that may indicate potential insider activities can assist the command in preventing the 
threat from becoming an actuality. By including mechanisms to record individual activity 
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that may be suspicious, especially when correlated with the individual’s previous 
behavior, the command can further focus on those individuals if necessary. Intervention 
and further investigation by the command at certain points within the architecture can 
then potentially prevent the insider from actually conducting malicious activities. 
However, if the command is unable to prevent malicious insider activity, the SIEM 
should be able to assist the command in detecting actual malicious insider activities. 
3. Detect 
A SIEM can be designed to notify management or certain individuals such as the 
security officer or commanding officer if certain pre-defined events occur and are 
captured by the SIEM. For example, if a SIEM rule is implemented that informs 
management of a large e-mail sent after-hours, then the SIEM can send an alert e-mail to 
management and/or add pertinent information regarding this event to a “watch” list 
maintained by the SIEM. This alerts the management of an activity that may warrant 
further investigation, and the command can then proceed to identify what information left 
the command and why it occurred after-hours. This “cue” of a potentially malicious event 
focuses the command on detecting the specifics of the activity and then facilitates 
corrective action. 
4. Correct 
Using the cues from the SIEM, the command’s management can take corrective 
steps to reduce the adverse impact resulting from the insider attack. This may require the 
command to issue a message regarding the potential compromise of sensitive 
information, notify the Naval Criminal Investigative Service regarding the issue, 
discipline the individual involved, or other actions as appropriate for the situation and 
environment. 
B. ARCSIGHT EXPRESS COMPONENTS  
As described in the previous chapters, an individual’s background data gathered 
from their PSI and administrative actions may help focus a SIEM on that person’s 
network activities, with the goal of identifying any possible inclinations towards 
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malicious activities. Within the ArcSight Express package, active lists, filters, and rules 
can be designed in a way to provide this capability. Active lists and filters specific to 
ArcSight Express are briefly described in the following sections. 
1. Active Lists 
Active lists are comparable to a type of watch list as described in previous 
chapters. Active lists are typically used within ArcSight Express in “conjunction with 
rules specifically tailored to interact with and populate the lists dynamically” (ArcSight, 
2011, p. 518). Rules are written to populate the list with certain data items of interest. 
Basically, the active list is a “shell to store/display the data” (ArcSight, 2011, p. 518) 
populated by any particular rule. In addition to being populated dynamically with rules-
driven data, active lists can also be populated manually with static entries (ArcSight, 
2012, p. 64). Active lists can also be used as input conditions for use in other rules. 
2. Filters 
Filters can be used as building blocks for rules and “are a set of conditions that 
focus on a particular set of event attributes” (ArcSight, 2012, p. 57). Filters serve to limit 
the number of events processed by the system, focusing only on the desired events 
(ArcSight, 2012, p. 57). They can also be used to specify conditions within rules. For 
example, filters can be created and applied to log sources, such as a printer. The filter can 
specify that only events exceeding certain limits, such as print batch sizes, or certain 
operational hours, such as after hours; are used by the specified rule for processing 
(Holloway & Santiago, 2012). Multiple filters from multiple log sources can be applied 
as condition statements feeding into a single rule.  
C. SAMPLE SIEM ARCHITECTURE WITH FILTERS, ACTIVE LISTS, 
AND BOOLEAN RULES 
Within ArcSight Express, there are many potential ways to organize the 
components in order to achieve the previously defined goals as related to the insider 
threat. One possible organization of ArcSight Express’s capabilities utilizes the basic 
components of active lists, filters, and rules in order to monitor for potential malicious 
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activities. This architecture focuses on using multiple active lists grouped by specified 
PSI, administrative events, and individual clearance levels; combined with multiple 
active lists grouped by specified network activities. This example is one of many 
potential ways to design the architecture based on specific Navy command size, mission, 
network components, etc.  
For this paper, the proposed example architecture uses multiple, grouped active 
lists. The architecture in this section can be used as a starting point for utilizing a SIEM 
tool to address insider threats. This design includes both manual inputs and automated 
inputs. Figure 10 provides an overview of this design. 
 
Figure 10.  Architecture for SIEM implementation 
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The process begins when a new user checks into a command. This user will have 
the security officer and administrative officer check their JPAS account for any security 
flags based on answers to SF-86 questions (if JPAS or its replacement eventually allows 
for these specific details to be represented). If there are any security flags, the security 
officer documents them on the individual’s SAAR-N form. Additionally, the security 
officer will document the clearance level of the new user. The same process is repeated 
by the administrative officer. If there are any items of interest, such as physical fitness 
test failures, nonjudicial punishment, etc., these are documented on the SAAR-N form. 
When the system administrator (or responsible entity) receives the SAAR-N form 
from the individual, she then makes an account for the new user with whatever accesses 
are typically required. The system administrator manually enters any information from 
the SAAR-N related to the potential indicators of malicious insider activities as described 
in Chapter III (foreign influence, financial issues, disgruntlement, previous arrests) as 
well as the clearance (if any) of the individual into its respective active list. The clearance 
active list can be tailored to each command. For example, the command may wish to 
monitor all users with a certain clearance level and can input these users into the 
Clearance Active List for this purpose.  
In this example, there are designated active lists for each of these five indicator 
categories. This manually entered information serves as the “baseline” security 
characterization for that individual. Rules are applied against this base information to 
which rules are applied in order to evaluate in conjunction with any subsequent user 
events of security relevance. The example Foreign Influence Active List designed within 
ArcSight Express is shown in Figure 11: 
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Figure 11.  Foreign Influence Active List designed in ArcSight Express 
The left side of the screenshot shows the content of the active list and the right 
side shows the characteristics of the active list. This list is updated manually. It shows the 
user IDs, in this case Users 5 and 6, and an inserted comment under the event annotation 
comment to describe the type of foreign influence: foreign spouse and foreign property in 
these examples. These manually updated active lists are designed with a time to live 
(TTL) of 0 in the time fields, which instructs the system to never expire them. These lists 
will then be used as conditions in various “insider” rules in order to assist the SIEM in 
focusing on specific users for potential malicious insider activities. The inclusion of the 
clearance level active list allows for commands to provide additional focus on individuals 
with certain clearance levels who may or may not have entries in the Foreign Influence, 
Financial, Disgruntlement, or Previous Arrest Active Lists. 
The “dynamic” section of the design shown in Figure 10 includes the various log 
sources that will be used as basic inputs for the SIEM design. These log sources are based 
on the potential data exfiltration methods described in Chapter VI and include printers, e-
mail activities, and web activities. These log sources are samples of the many potential 
log sources that can be implemented using this architecture as a basic template. Other log 
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sources can be implemented depending upon the structure of the specific command and 
its network components. In order for the SIEM to effectively process these log sources, 
filters must be used to eliminate designated normal activities for those nodes. The 
following paragraphs will describe examples of some of the conditions for the filters that 
can compose this architecture.  
1. Data Exfiltration Filter 
The components of this filter can be designed in ArcSight Express to include 
activities such as afterhours printing, excessive printer use, and e-mail characteristics 
such as time and size (Holloway & Santiago, 2012). As discussed in Chapter VI, these 
are potential means to exfiltrate data without proper authorization. The above described 
filters can be incorporated, in conjunction with a login active list, into rules that evaluate 
these conditions and provide input to a related active list. An example data exfiltration 
filter concerning printer events is shown below in Figure 12. This filter allows events 
through that meet the conditions defined in the filter. Some possible conditions, as shown 
in Figure 12, could be files sent to the printer larger than 1 megabyte, or sent between the 
hours of 1700 and 0600. These events may require further analysis. These times and file 
sizes can be adjusted to values based on specific command requirements. For example, 
some users at a command may consistently work after hours or send large files causing 
potential false-positives. Establishing baseline behavior would assist the command in 
fine-tuning this filter and perhaps even developing filters for each user based on their 
typical network activities. The values used here simply provide an example of a filter’s 
capabilities for use in the overall SIEM architecture. 
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Figure 12.  Printer conditions for data exfiltration filter  
(After Holloway & Santiago, 2012) 
2. Financial Filter 
These financial filters can be designed in ArcSight Express to focus on user Web 
activity. Specifically, these filters focus on user visits to pre-designated websites that may 
indicate potential financial issues for the individual. For example, major bankruptcy 
websites can be entered into the filter as a condition. Also, the filter can be designed to 
include key words within the URL visited. If a user visits one of these pre-designated or 
key word websites, then that event will be included in the filter and the filter can then be 
used as a condition in a rule. A user visiting these sites may be indicative of potential 
financial issues. This filter would also typically contain specified information to 
designate the log source, such as asset id, or category group, in order to further define the 
specific logs as sources for this filter (Holloway & Santiago, 2012). 
3. Foreign Influence Filter 
This filter can be designed to specifically look for any Web surfing activity to 
non- .mil, .gov, .com, .org, or .edu domains. This filter records activity to domains 
outside of those typically used for work-related functions. This filter can also include e-
mails sent to these domains (Holloway and Santiago, 2012). For example, if an individual 
has a previous background condition indicating potential foreign influence from Russia, 
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visits or e-mails to a .ru domain might be reason for further investigation, and this filter 
will provide the event information for further evaluation.  
4. User Login Rule 
The user login rule includes the log sources of designated operating systems and 
writes the user ID and time of access to an active list. This active list contains an 
expiration time of one day as it will be refreshed each day. This active list containing the 
user IDs, system IDs, and times of access can then be used as a condition for three rules: 
the financial rule, the foreign influence rule, and the data exfiltration rule. These three 
rules take the previously described filters and relate them to the user IDs contained within 
the User Login Active List.  
5. Financial, Foreign Influence, and Data Exfiltration Rules 
The financial rule takes the associated financial filters and compares them to the 
User Login Active List. If there is a user logged in and the user ID matches with one of 
the filters, then the user ID information is output to the Financial Activity Active List. An 
example of the financial rule is shown in Figure 13: 
 
Figure 13.  Financial rule designed using ArcSight Express 
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The rule shown in Figure 13 evaluates both the financial filter condition and the 
User Login Active List condition. If the user ID is present in both of these conditions, the 
rule will output to the Financial Activity Active List. Figure 14 shows the screen defining 
the rule actions. This rule outputs the Source User ID based on its occurrence in both the 
financial filter and the User Login Active List to the Financial Activity Active List for 
each event. 
 
Figure 14.  Financial rule action designed using ArcSight Express 
Each of these activity rules will output to a specified active list as shown in Figure 
10. These active lists will then be used as conditions for evaluation by the Insider 
Warning rules. 
6. Indications and Insider Warning Rules 
There are two rules within this section of the architecture shown in Figure 10. The 
first rule, the Indications rule, takes the three active lists underneath the dynamic section 
of Figure 10 and compares them with the user Foreign Influence Active List, User 
Financial Active List, Disgruntlement Active List, and Previous Arrest Active List. If a 
user ID is NOT on at least one of these four active lists, but IS on one of the activity 
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active lists, then that user ID is added to the Indications Active List as shown in Figures 
15 and 16. 
 
Figure 15.  Indications rule designed using ArcSight Express 
The rule shown in Figure 15 states that if a user ID is in the Financial Activity 
Active List, OR the Foreign Influence Activity Active List, OR the Data Exfiltration 
Active List; AND the user ID is NOT in one of the four manually developed User active 
lists based on previous indicators, then the user ID will be output to the Indications 
Active List as shown in Figure 16. This rule does not include the Clearance Active List as 




Figure 16.  Indications rule output to Indications Active List  
designed using ArcSight Express 
The reasoning for this indications rule is to capture activity by users who may not 
have previous indicators on their record from their PSI and administrative action history. 
This provides another possibility for evaluation by designated personnel to capture 
activity by individuals who were not already on one of the manually entered active lists. 
The user ID must then be manually added to its respective User active list depending on 
the type of event activity (financial, foreign, or data exfiltration). Once these events are 
added to their respective user active lists, appropriate information can then be captured 
and evaluated (along with other event conditions) using the Insider Warning rule as 




Figure 17.  Insider Warning rule designed using ArcSight Express 
The Insider Warning rule shown in Figure 17 contains five sections. The first 
logical operator used is “OR.”  If an event matches the first sub-conditions within the rule 
OR the second OR the third OR the fourth OR the fifth; then the rule action will be to 
write the user ID to the Insider Warning Active List.  
The first section of the Insider Warning rule begins with the AND logical 
operator. If a user ID is in the User Financial Active List AND the user ID is either in the 
Financial Activity Active List OR the Data Exfiltration Active List OR the Clearance 
Active List; then this satisfies the condition for the rule and the user ID will be added to 
the Insider Warning Active List. The reasoning behind this rule segment is that if an 
individual is already on an active list based on their PSI or administrative action entries 
for any type of financial issues and the user ID shows up on the current Financial Activity 
Active List, this should be added to a warning list for further evaluation. Also, if the user 
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is on the User Financial Active List AND shows up on the Data Exfiltration Active List, 
this also might be an event that requires further evaluation and the user ID will be added 
to the Insider Warning Active List. Finally, if the user ID is on the User Financial Active 
List AND has the specified clearance level designated on the User Clearance Active List, 
then the user will be added to the Insider Warning Active List. This allows a command to 
capture potential activities by individuals who hold certain clearance levels. For example, 
individuals with higher clearance levels may be able to cause more damage. Thus the 
command may want to capture suspect activities using this format. The reasoning is the 
same for the construction of the second sub-condition related to foreign influence.  
For the third and fourth sections of the Insider Warningrule, if the user ID is on 
the User Disgruntled Active List AND is on the Data Exfiltration Active List OR the 
Clearance Active List, this indicates an event requiring further evaluation and will thus be 
added to the Insider Warning Active List. The same is true if the user ID is on the 
Previous Arrest Active List AND the Data Exfiltration Active List OR the Clearance 
Active List. For example, if a user is on the Clearance Active List and is later manually 
added to the Previous Arrest Active List for an incident during the user’s time at the 
command (i.e., after initial check-in), this rule will evaluate the conditions and 
automatically add this user ID to the Insider Warning Active List based on his being on 
both the Previous Arrest AND Clearance Active Lists.  
For the fifth section, if a user ID is added to the Indications Active List AND is on 
the Clearance Active List, this will also output to the Insider Warning Active List. The 
reasoning for this section is that a command will most likely want to monitor any 
suspicious events related to users with certain clearance levels, and these users may not 
have any previous background indicators in their records. This allows for further 
investigation as necessary. 
By using previously formatted active lists as conditions to the Insider Warning 
rule, this allows management the flexibility to re-arrange and design the rule conditions 
to match their requirements. For example, a commanding officer, may desire to link the 
User Disgruntled Active List with the Financial Activity and Foreign Influence Active 
Lists for further monitoring of potential disgruntled user activities. This can be done by 
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simply re-arranging the logical operators and supplying the necessary active lists as 
conditions. 




Figure 18.  Insider Warning Rule output to Insider Warning Active List  
designed using ArcSight Express 
For each event that matches one of the primary OR conditions of the Insider 
Warning rule, the user ID will be added to the Insider Warning Active List. The Insider 
Warning Active List will have a TTL of zero so that it can be reviewed at any time by 
designated personnel.  
The use of two rules and active lists for this architecture as shown in Figure 10 
provides a tiered structure for evaluation purposes. An individual showing up on the 
Indications active list may not warrant a detailed investigation, but a command may still 
want to record these activities and possibly investigate. However, if the individual shows 
up on the Indications Active List and has a clearance level of concern for the command, 
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the system automatically places them on the Insider Warning Active List. Also, if an 
individual has background indicators of concern, then the system will automatically add 
them to the Insider Warning Active List if their network activities drive them to 
placement on one of the Activity active lists and the specifics of the events can then be 
further evaluated. 
User ID additions to the Indications or Insider Warning Active Lists do not prove 
that an individual conducted potential malicious insider activities, but it is a cue for 
further evaluation and can assist in the previously described goals of deterrence, 
prevention, and detection. By adding the user ID to these active lists based on these 
conditions, false positives will most likely occur at some point. User activity that results 
in their addition to these active lists could be simply part of their routine job activities or 
other benign situations. However, highlighting the user’s name offers management the 
opportunity to investigate and determine whether or not this was simply a false positive 
or an actual event of concern. A command’s response to false positives could be time 
consuming, however, a command’s response to a false negative, where an actual 
malicious event occurred, is most likely much more resource intensive. For these reasons, 
this architecture using multiple, grouped active lists is designed to be more general in 
nature. By not having individual rules and individual active lists designed for each user, 
this means more non-malicious users will potentially trip one of the rules and require 
further action by the command to investigate innocent activities. However, this tips the 
false-indications balance in favor of too many false-positives rather than missed false-
negatives.  
This example SIEM architecture was used to illustrate the potential and flexibility 
associated with using the various components of a SIEM to detect or prevent insider 
threats. As previously described, these components can be arranged in a variety of ways 
to better meet specific command needs or requirements.  
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VIII. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
A. CONCLUSIONS 
This thesis reviewed the basics of SIEMs, insider threats, Navy PSI and 
administrative actions and data exfiltration methods. The objective of this thesis was to 
show how Navy commands can potentially include PSI and administrative actions for 
individuals into a SIEM framework for purposes of deterring, preventing, and detecting 
insider threats. 
This objective was satisfied through the architecture described in Chapter VII. A 
detailed process of including individuals’ background information from their PSI and any 
administrative actions as input to a SIEM was described. This process uses multiple 
active lists to create rules based on user background data and their network activity that 
would trigger alerts of potential insider misuse. If a user conducts pre-defined suspicious 
network activity, then the user’s ID is added to an active list for further investigation by 
designated command personnel. Additionally, this architecture allows a Navy command 
to focus on the network activities of users with certain clearances. The example 
architecture provided can serve as a basis for further evaluation for the potential benefits 
of using user background information as components of a SIEM to assist in combatting 
malicious insiders.  
B. BENEFITS TO THE DON 
Personnel with authorized access to Navy accounts and networks, combined with 
malicious intent, present a uniquely challenging threat that needs to be mitigated via 
deterrence, prevention and detection. Malicious insiders can pose a significant threat on 
CONUS networks, ships’ networks, and forward-deployed networks. The research 
conducted for this thesis and the architecture described will potentially add capabilities 
for combating insider threats on Navy networks.  
Even unclassified data can provide enemy forces with insight into Navy 
operations and intentions, violating operational security and putting U.S. forces and 
personnel at risk. Time gaps between security background investigations, combined with 
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not updating user profiles with any sort of administrative action, can increase the risk of 
insider threats.  
The combination of personnel data already collected during the security clearance 
process with documented administrative actions, along with the network account accesses 
and activities, can give network administrators and commanding officer’s better insight 
into their personnel’s network activities. By using a SIEM tool to correlate user activity 
with their detailed account profile, the pre-defined rules can trigger alerts of potentially 
malicious activity based on specific events, and these can stimulate further investigations.  
C. FUTURE WORK 
There are some basic issues that will need to be researched and addressed prior to 
including a SIEM tool as a basic component of a command’s insider threat program. The 
architecture described in Chapter VII uses basic filters, active lists and rules as its 
components. These filters can be further defined to capture even more relevant data based 
on a variety of log sources, producing even more active lists and potentially more rules. 
The components shown in Chapter VII were used to illustrate the potential of the tool and 
can be expanded to further enhance the abilities of this tool. 
Purchase costs, administration, and training for the use and implementation of this 
tool also need to be considered. A cost-benefit analysis can assist in determining the 
feasibility of using this type of tool, quantifying the costs of the SIEM, maintenance, 
training, and administration against its ability to effectively combat insider threats. 
Additionally, the legalities of including an individual’s PSI and administrative actions on 
a network access request form need to be addressed out of concern for privacy and 
possible Constitutional issues. Privacy issues would also need to be resolved in order for 
the JPAS process to be changed to allow specifics from the PSI readily accessible by 
security personnel for inclusion as SIEM sources. 
Another aspect requiring future work is the transmission of the user information 
to travel with them from command to command. While the PSI and documented 
administrative actions will always be a component of the individual’s record, regardless 
of location; the specific network activities recorded on the previously described active 
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lists will remain at that specific command. A means to incorporate these active lists into a 
user’s record, accessible Navy-wide, could provide greater fidelity into the user’s total 
activity across commands. Additionally, a method for a user’s recorded network activities 
to be accessible across service boundaries would provide even further fidelity on an 
individual across their career. Automating the process by which SAAR-N information 
can be entered into the active lists may also be possible by using a cloud service. This 
would decrease the administrative burden of manually entering user information. 
Consideration and research of the above described items can further increase the 
effectiveness of using a SIEM tool against insider threats, increasing the overall security 
posture of the Navy’s networks.  
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